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Must the Alleged RICO "Person"
and the Alleged RICO "Enterprise"
Be Distinct Under §1962(c)?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 359-362. © 2001 American Bar Association.
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ISSUE
May a claim be maintained under
I§1962(c) of RICO when the alleged
RICO "enterprise" is a corporation
and the "person" charged with the
violation of RICO is an officer and
employee of the corporation acting
with the scope of his corporate
duties?

success depends on his ability to
enter into exclusive, contractual
relationships with individual boxers
and then promote matches involving those fighters.
In 1995, Kushner signed an exclusive promotional contract with a
boxer named Hasim Rahman.
Kushman later provided Rahman
with 20 professional bouts with
purses to Rahman totaling hundreds
of thousands of dollars. In June
1998, Kushner entered into a new
exclusive promotional contract with
Rahman and gave him a $150,000
signing bonus. At Rahman's request,
Kushner arranged a match against
David Tua, to be televised on HBO.
In September 1998, Rahman signed
another agreement with Kushner for
this match and received a $25,000
advance from Kushner for training
expenses.

FACTS
This case involves a dispute
between rival boxing promoters,
Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd.
(Kushner) and Don King (King), Don
King Productions, Inc., and DKP
Corporation (DKP).
Because this case involves an appeal
from a motion to dismiss, the following facts are based on the allegations in the complaint, so at this
stage the courts are required to
accept those allegations as true.

On Aug. 22, 1998, King had one of
his attorneys call Rahman. The
(Continued on Page 360)
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According to the complaint,
Kushner and King are direct competitors in the business of promoting professional boxing matches. In
this business, a promoter's financial
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attorney told Rahman that King
wanted to speak with him about the
Tua fight and that he should not
take the fight. King and Rahman
met a short time later and King told
Rahman not to fight Tua.
When King and Rahman met several
days later, King gave Rahman a
$125,000 check to ensure that
Rahman would not fight Tua. King
told Rahman that Rahman could
never be the No. 1 heavyweight
challenger without King as his
promoter.
In August, Kushner met with
Rahman and Rahman's manager and
trainer. During that meeting,
Rahman confirmed that he had
signed a promotional contract with
King and said that King had threatened him. Kushner alleged that King
was aware of plaintiffs contract with
Rahman and that King's contract
with Rahman directly conflicts with
Kushner's contract with Rahman.
Rahman did not fight Tua in 1998.
Kushner claimed that King persuaded Rahman to feign a hand injury
two weeks before the fight, and the
bout was subsequently canceled.
Louis DelValle, another professional
boxer, was also under an exclusive
promotional agreement with
Kushner. Kushner arranged for
DelValle to fight Darrio Mattione, a
professional boxer promoted by
King. King agreed to pay Kushner
$300,000 for the DelValle bout.
When another bout scheduled for
the same evening was canceled,
King canceled the DelValle fight
with Mattione. Kushner was not
paid under the DelValle contract.
In 1998, Kushner filed a complaint
for $12 million in damages, asserting claims against King and DKP
under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (18
U.S.C.§§ 1961 et seq.) and for com-

mon law fraud and tortious interference with contract. In his complaint, Kushner claimed that King
had violated Section 1962(c) of
RICO and had conspired to do so in
violation of Section 1962(d). These
sections provide a basis for both
civil and criminal liability under
RICO. Among other things, the
complaint alleged wire and insurance fraud whereby King caused
DKP's controller fraudulently to
alter documents and to telecopy
such falsified documents to DKP's
insurance agents, insurance underwriters, and others.
The trial court granted King's
motion to dismiss the RICO claims
and also dismissed the remaining
state law claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 1999 WL
771366 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Kushner
then appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. The
Second Circuit affirmed the district
court, holding that, in order for
there to be liability under Section
1962(c), the alleged RICO "person"
and the RICO "enterprise" must be
distinct. 219 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2000)
(per curiam). Because King was an
employee acting within the scope of
his authority at DKP, the Second
Circuit concluded that King, the
RICO "person," and DKP, the RICO
"enterprise," were not distinct and
thus that there was no RICO liability under Section 1962(c).
The Supreme Court thereafter
granted Kushner's request for review
of the Second Circuit's decision. 121
S.Ct. 653 (2000).
CASE ANALYSIS
Congress enacted RICO as Title IX
of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970. The stated purpose of
RICO is to seek the eradication of
organized crime in the United
States by strengthening the legal
tools in the evidence-gathering
process, establishing new penal pro-
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hibitions, and providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal
with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in crime.
RICO provides criminal and civil
sanctions. A civil RICO action may
be brought by either a government
plaintiff or a private plaintiff
"injured in his business or property." A successful plaintiff can recover treble damages in a civil RICO
action. An increase in the use of the
civil RICO provisions by private
plaintiffs has been accompanied by
complaints asserting that many civil
RICO suits have been beyond the
Act's scope and are abusive. See
Sedima, S.PR.L. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985) (suggesting that correction of any defect
inherent in RICO must lie with
Congress). The courts have
acknowledged confusion regarding
the proper interpretation of civil
RICO statutes. Beauford v.
Helmsley, 843 F.2d 103, 104 (2d Cir.
1988), opinion vacated, 492 U.S.
914 (1989) ("Despite the Supreme
Court's decision in Sedima ... ,
courts generally, and courts in the
Second Circuit in particular, remain
confused (and certainly confusing)
in their construction of the statutes
governing so-called civil RICO, the
provision of a private civil remedy
of treble damages for injury 'by reason of a violation of' the substantive
provisions of [RICO]").
RICO is not limited in its scope to
organized crime. H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S.
229, 243-44 (1989); Sedima,
S.PR.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
499 (1985). Defendants, whether
natural persons or corporate entities, do not have to be associated
with organized crime in order to
qualify as a "person" who has
engaged in proscribed activities.
Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343,
1353-54 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1002 (1983). Both legitimate
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and illegitimate enterprises engaged
in a pattern of racketeering are
liable under RICO. H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S.
229, 243-44 (1989); Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
499 (1985).
"Racketeering activity" involves the
commission of a "predicate offense."
Sedima, S.PL.R. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479, 495 (1985). Section
1961(1) contains a list of predicate
acts. The list of predicate acts is
exhaustive; no act not listed in
Section 1961(1) can constitute a
predicate offense for purposes of
RICO.
RICO does not require that a defendant be convicted of any of the
underlying predicate acts before a
civil RICO action can be initiated.
Sedima, S.PL.R. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479, 493 (1985). A "pattern" of
racketeering may encompass multiple predicates within a single
scheme that were related and
amounted to, or threatened the likelihood of, continued criminal activity. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237 (1989).
The two most frequently alleged
predicate acts are mail or wire
fraud.
Section 1962(c) makes it unlawful
for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise that is
engaged in or affects interstate or
foreign commerce to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt. A "person" for purposes of RICO includes any individual or entity capable of holding a
legal or beneficial interest in property. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(3). RICO
broadly determines "person" to
include corporations and municipal
corporations.

Section 1961 defines an "enterprise" as including "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4). See
United States v. Thrkette, 452 U.S.
576, 583 (1981) (elements necessary to establish existence of an
enterprise for RICO purposes are
(1) evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal; (2) evidence that various associates function as a continuing unit; and (3)
existence separate and apart from
the pattern of activity in which it
engages).
RICO actions are limited to those
suits in which the plaintiff can
prove an ascertainable ongoing organization or "enterprise" that is distinct from a pattern of racketeering
activity and whose members function as a continuing unit for a common or shared purpose. See United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
583 (1981) (the "enterprise" is an
entity while the "pattern" of racketeering activity is a series of criminal acts as defined by statute).
Kushner argues that there is no
express requirement in Section
1962(c) to plead distinctness
between the RICO "person" and the
"enterprise." According to Kushner,
any implied requirement of distinctness is necessarily satisfied by identifying separate legal entities as the
RICO "person" and the "enterprise"
without inquiring into the degree of
distinctness. Relying on United
States v. Turkette, Kushner says
that a corporation is both a legal
entity and a defined "enterprise"
regardless of whether its affairs are
legitimate or not. Kushner says
that because he has alleged that an
individual natural person (King) is
an employee of a corporate enterprise (DKP), nothing more is

required to satisfy any requirement
of distinctiveness.
King disagrees, claiming that the
requisite "distinctness" between a
RICO "enterprise" and a RICO "person" does not exist if the employee's
alleged predicate acts are committed within the scope of his or her
employment and on behalf of the
corporation rather than outside the
scope of employment and for the
employee's own benefit. Declaring
that the Second Circuit's position is
consistent with the expressed legislative intent in RICO, King contends that his purported racketeering acts are no different from those
of DKP, the alleged "enterprise" on
whose behalf and for whose benefit
his actions were taken. It is King's
position that DKP and King are
functionally identical under Section
1962(c) because, acting in his
capacity as DKP's president and for
DKP's benefit, King was DKP.
According to Kushner, Section
1962(c) is directed, in part, at
employees of enterprises who have
the power to conduct that enterprise's affairs. When there is a formal legal entity identified as the
RICO enterprise, such as DKP,
Kushner says there is no issue of
either scope of authority, legitimacy
of activity, type of activity, or degree
of distinctness; rather, the dispositive issue is whether the employee
has the ability to operate or manage
the enterprise so as to conduct its
affairs through a pattern of racketeering. See Reves v. Ernst & Young,
507 U.S. 170, 179 (1993).
In response, King states that the
appropriate test for employee liability under Section 1962(c) is whether
the employee's alleged predicate
acts are conducted for the employee's benefit and on his or her individual behalf, or, as the Second
Circuit has stressed, "on behalf of
(Continued on Page 362)
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the corporation." King urges that in
the former instance the requisite
"distinctness" exists between the
employee and the "enterprise" corporate employer, but that in the latter instance it does not.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Second Circuit's decision in
this case conflicts with the decisions
of other courts of appeals. See, e.g.,
JaguarCars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks
Motor Car Co., 46 F.3d 258, 265-69
(3d Cir. 1995); Khuranav.
Innovative Healty Care Systems,
Inc., 130 F.3d 143, 156 (5th Cir.
1997); Davis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
of New York, 6 F.3d 367, 377-78
(6th Cir. 1993); Richmond v.
Nationwide Cassel L.P, 52 F.3d
640, 646-47 (7th Cir. 1995); Sever
v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d
1529, 1534 (9th Cir. 1992);
Brannon v. Boatmen's FirstNat'l
Bank of Okla., 153 F.3d 1144, 1148
n.4 (10th Cir. 1998).
The First Circuit, however, appears
to agree with the Second Circuit's
interpretation of Section 1962(c).
See Bessette v. Avco Financial
Service, Inc., 230 F.3d 439, 449-50
(1st Cir. 2000).
In its amicus brief, the United
States contends that the practical
consequences of upholding the
Second Circuit's decision would be

severe. Kushner and the United
States suggest that the Second
Circuit's approach would permit a
criminal to incorporate and thereby
take advantage of the corporate
shield attendant to that separate
entity and then be immune from
RICO prosecution because of the
Second Circuit's overbroad distinctness rule.

ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For Cedric Kushner Promotions,
Ltd. (Richard A. Edlin (212) 8481000)
For Don King et al. (Peter E.
Fleming Jr. (212) 696-6000)

AMIcus BRIEFS
King says this is incorrect. Where
the corporate form is a sham, King
asserts that Section 1962(c) would
apply because individual actors can
be held liable for using a sham corporate enterprise as a passive tool to
extract money or to achieve some
other illegal purpose through a pattern of racketeering activity. He
argues that the real threat to justice
is the sweeping application of
Section 1962(c) espoused by
Kushner, which would expose individuals to potential treble damage
liability based on garden-variety
fraud allegations simply because
they are employed by a corporation
that can then always be named as
the RICO "enterprise."

In Support of Cedric Kushner
Promotions, Ltd.
National Association of Securities
and Commercial Law Attorneys
(Kevin P. Roddy (213) 861-7454)
The United States (Barbara D.
Underwood, Acting Solicitor
General (202) 514-2217)

According to King, such exposure
would discourage service by qualified individuals on boards of directors of both for-profit and charitable
corporations, "which hardly seems a
wise policy decision."
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